Fórum E-Commerce Brasil 2026 did not bring news about exporting. It brought confirmation. What used to be a future hypothesis has become present behavior. That showed up in every booth conversation and every panel about international operations.
ShipSmart took part in all three days of the event, at booth N23. The team also joined the Apex Brasil stage, in a panel on cross border e-commerce operations. Both experiences, the booth and the stage, confirmed the same pattern from different angles.
This article organizes what got confirmed into four blocks. First, the real problem behind Brazilian exports. Second, the numbers behind that problem. Third, the solution discussed on the Apex Brasil stage. Finally, the practical takeaways left after the event.
A problem that is no longer hypothetical
For years, exporting was treated as a distant decision for most Brazilian companies. A mid term project, easy to postpone, dependent on ideal conditions that never fully arrived.
That phase appears to be over. Conversations at booth N23 showed a different pattern than previous editions of the Forum registered.
Most questions were no longer about whether selling abroad is worth it. They were about how to structure that sale without repeating the mistakes that stall operations already underway.
This shift, from strategic doubt to operational doubt, is the real problem the event exposed. It is not a lack of will to export. It is a lack of structure to sustain exports after the first sale.
The numbers behind this shift
Brazil’s domestic e-commerce keeps growing steadily. The sector posted revenue of R$235.5 billion in 2025, up 15.3% from the previous year. There were 438.9 million orders and an average ticket of R$536.60. Active buyers reached 94.2 million. For 2026, projected revenue stands at R$259.8 billion, a further 10.3% increase.
This domestic growth is what pushes companies toward the next step. A mature domestic market, with intense competition and margin under pressure, pushes companies outward. In that scenario, the international market becomes a real growth alternative, not just a theoretical one.
On the export side overall, government data also shows expansion. Brazil’s total export volume grew 6.7% in June 2026. That result is the third highest in the entire historical series. Growth stood out most in exports to the Middle East, Central America and the Caribbean, and Asia.
So the macro picture lines up. The domestic market grows, export volume grows. What has not grown at the same speed is smaller companies’ capacity to execute. They still stumble on execution, not on the will to export.
Where Brazilian exports actually stall
Here is the point that separates intent from execution. A CNI survey shows that 31% of companies faced barriers in their export destination markets. Among those companies, the obstacles break down clearly.
Import tariffs rank as the main barrier, cited by 67.2% of companies. Next come customs bureaucracy in the destination country, cited by 37.8%, and technical standards, by 37%. Trade defense measures, at 28.6%, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures, at 25.2%, complete the list.
These five points are not abstract. They describe exactly what shows up in any cross border operation. Duty calculated wrong, documentation that fails at customs, a technical requirement discovered too late.
CNI’s own report has already catalogued more than 160 barriers Brazilian companies face in international markets. Among them are sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical regulations, and import taxes.
That number is high enough to make clear none of these barriers are the exception. They are the rule of international operations, not the exception. Whoever does not prepare treats as a surprise what should be routine.
When asked about trade negotiation priorities, companies named two markets. The United States came up at 69%, and China at 34%. That is no coincidence. Those are the two markets with the most discussed regulatory changes at the Forum.
The tariff hike changed the math, it did not create the problem
In July 2026, the United States applied a 25% tariff on Brazilian exports. Days later, an additional 12.5% surcharge related to forced labor followed, replacing the prior temporary 10% rate. Combined, these two layers reach up to 37.5% on non exempt products.
This tariff move became the most discussed topic at booth N23 and across much of the event’s tracks. But it is worth separating two things that often get confused. The tariff hike did not create Brazil’s structural export problem.
It simply made visible, abruptly, a problem that already existed. That problem is an operation without margin to absorb a cost change without revising the entire pricing structure.
Companies with precisely calculated landed cost and organized documentation felt the tariff hike as a spreadsheet adjustment. Companies operating without that structure felt it as a crisis.
In that sense, the tariff hike worked as an involuntary stress test. It did not invent the fragility, it only revealed who already had enough structure to absorb the shock.
The solution discussed on the Apex Brasil panel
On the Apex Brasil stage, the panel on cross border operations brought together Pierre Jacquin and Rafael Weldo, ShipSmart cofounders. Alongside them was Frederico Eidelwein, from Arezzo&Co.
The discussion started from a direct premise. The end of exemption regimes, like de minimis, does not eliminate exporting. It forces a rethink of product portfolio.
The practical conclusion was clear. Direct shipping and local fulfillment do not compete with each other. They solve the same goal with different cost structures. The right choice depends on three variables per product line. Those are average ticket, inventory turnover, and consumer sensitivity to delivery time.
High ticket, low turnover products usually still make sense for direct shipping. Margin absorbs the longer lead time without hurting conversion.
Low ticket, high turnover products change the logic. The consumer compares delivery time before deciding. That is where local fulfillment becomes a direct competitive advantage.
The most repeated mistake, according to the panel itself, is treating this choice as a single decision for the whole company. In practice, the same brand can run both models at once. Each model applies to the product line it fits best.
What remains as a practical takeaway
Bringing the four blocks together, a consistent pattern emerges. The market grows, both inside and outside Brazil. The barriers that stall exports are known, documented, and repeated year after year. The 2026 tariff hike did not invent any fragility, it only exposed who already had structure and who did not.
The solution discussed at the event does not depend on picking a single logistics model. It depends on calibrating the model by product.
The most direct takeaway is this. The decision to export has already been made by the market. What remains to decide is the structure. Duties calculated before the sale, documentation validated before shipment, logistics model defined by product line. None of these decisions should come from a company’s general intuition.
If you want to understand where your operation stands before the next sales peak, talk to our team. Find out what needs adjusting now.
